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TWO IMPORTANT BOOKS ON RES 
JUDICATA 
Robert C Casad* 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, VOLUME 18: JURISDIC-
TION AND RELATED MATTERS. By Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller, and Edward H. Cooper. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co. 1981. Pp. xi, 801. $30. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND: JUDGMENTS 2d. As 
adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute at Wash-
ington, D.C., June 12, 1980. St. Paul, Minn.: American Law In-
stitute Publishers. 1982. 3 vols. Pp. 1435 approx. (publication 
forthcoming). 
1981 was an important year for the law of res judicata. Two 
works published last year are a major addition to the literature of the 
subject.1 The first of these works, in terms of publication date, is 
volume 18 of the treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure, by 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper. 
The volume is devoted entirely to the law of res judicata in federal 
practice and procedure, but the principles it deals with, and the theo-
retical analysis it provides, are generally applicable. The other work, 
which was only available in page proof when this review was writ-
ten, is the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments. Although the Restatement is the later to be published in final 
form, it has been before the public in tentative draft for several 
years. Parts of the Wright, Miller, and Cooper volume were signifi-
cantly influenced by the Restatement project.2 
• John H. and John M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1950, M.A. 
1952, University of Kansas; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan; S.J.D. 1979, Harvard Univer-
sity. - Ed. 
1. The existing literature appears mainly in periodicals and cases. The only other compre-
hensive work in general treatise form is lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1980). A 
good single volume work, but of somewhat narrower scope is A. VESTAL, RES Jum-
CATA/PRECLUSION (1969). Still more limited, but (I hope} useful, is R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA 
IN A NUTSHELL (1976). 
2. The authors of the treatise acknowledge, for instance, that "[m]uch of this chapter [Basic 
Principles] has been heavily influenced by the great advances made in the Restatement Second 
of Judgments." P. 5. In tum, however, the Restatement (Second) may have been influenced by 
the authors of the treatise, since both Professors Wright and Cooper were among the advisers 
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Each of these works is a magnificent product of thought and 
scholarship. To do justice to either in a book review would require 
more time and space than are available to me, and would demand 
erudition possessed by few persons other than the authors them-
selves. I can do no more than sketch a few of the salient points. 
These will be, essentially, points about which there is currently gen-
eral controversy, points on which the two works seem to disagree, or 
points on which I disagree with one or the other. 
Already in 1970, when the Restatement (Second) project began, 
the time was ripe for a major reexamination of the field. The Ameri-
can Law Institute's first Restatement of the Law of Judgments was 
promulgated in 1942. No matter which side one takes in the peren-
nial debate over the proper function of a Restatement - to state 
what the Law is or what it should be3 - it is clear that the first · 
Restatement no longer served its function well. For instance, nearly 
one fourth of the work concerned validity of judgments - matters of 
jurisdiction. A comprehensive statement of principles of territorial 
jurisdiction written before the landmark decisions of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington 4 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co .5 and their progeny could hardly succeed in stating either 
what the law is or what it ought to be. The final product of the 
Restatement (Second) project is a good synthesis of what the law is 
on the subjects that it deals with and what it should be at this point 
in history. The Restatement (Second) is mainly the work of the Re-
porters, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., principally, and his pred-
ecessors (before 1974), Professors (now Justice) Benjamin Kaplan 
and David Shapiro. The work is, as I have elsewhere declared, a 
"prodigious achievement."6 
Structurally, the Restatement (Second) follows the basic pattern 
of the first Restatement. In both, there is a brief introductory chapter 
followed by chapters dealing with validity of judgments (jurisdic-
tion), effects of judgments, persons affected by judgments, and relief 
from judgments. The Restatement (Second) also includes a sixth 
chapter, which had no counterpart in the earlier work, entitled "Spe-
cial Problems Deriving from Nature of Forum Rendering Judg-
on the Restatement (Second) project. The treatise ap~ared in time for references to it to be· 
included in the final version of the Restatement (Second). 
3. See Martin, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Overview, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 404 (1981). 
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
5. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
6. Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 510, 510 (1981). 
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ment." This chapter deals with the effects of adjudications by 
administrative tribunals and arbitration panels, criminal judgments 
in later civil actions, state court judgments in federal court actions, 
and federal court judgments generally. The Restatement (Second), 
like its predecessor, does not deal directly with the interstate effects 
of state court judgments. Since it confines itself basically to the "in-
tramural" law of res judicata, it leaves the extraterritorial effects of 
judgm~nts to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Those 
who have seen only the tentative drafts should note that although the 
final version of the Restatment (Second) does not differ greatly from 
the earlier text, the numbering of the sections has changed. 
I. JURISDICTION 
A. Terminology 
The Restatement (Second) attempts to express the principles that 
it enunciates in terminology more appropriate to modem analysis 
than that in which the first Restatement was couched. This effort is 
apparent in Chapter Two, which deals with judicial jurisdiction. 
Now that differences between actions in rem and actions in per-
sonam have come to be understood as artificial, it is possible for the 
Restatement (Second) to give a simple, all-purpose black-letter state-
ment of the requisites of a valid judgment, which it does in section 1: 
A court has authority to render judgment in an action when the court 
has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, as stated in § 11, 
and 
(1) The party against whom judgment is to be rendered has submit-
ted to the jurisdiction of the court, or 
(2) Adequate notice has been afforded the party, as stated in § 2, and 
the court has territorial jurisdiction of the action, as stated in §§ 4 to 9. 
The draftsmen deliberately chose the term 'Jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter'' instead of the first Restatement's vaguer "competency." 
There is some ambiguity in the term 'Jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter'' since it is sometimes used to refer to jurisdiction over the res in 
actions in rem or quasi in rem. But the commentary successfully 
clarifies that problem. Whatever ambiguity remains is less serious 
than that contained in "competency,"7 and in any event "subject 
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 105, Comment a, at 316 
(1971) ("A court may lac_k competence either because it has not been given power by the state 
to entertain the particular action or because there has not been compliance with such require-
ments as are necessary for the exercise of power by the court."); A. EHRENZWEIO & D. Loui-
SELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 11 (3d ed. 1973) ("Jurisdiction should generally be 
distinguished from venue or competency: the Court's authority to adjudicate cases arising in a 
certain territory, e.g. 'the Southern District of New York.'"). In one recent case the term 
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matter jurisdiction" is far more commonly used. 
The term "territorial jurisdiction" in the quoted section "refers to 
the connection between the territorial authority of the court and the 
action that has been brought before the court" (Introductory Com-
ment to Ch. 2). The use of the general term "territorial jurisdiction 
of the action" rather than the conventional 'jurisdiction over the 
person," if the action is in personam, or 'jurisdiction over the res," if 
the action is in rem or quasi in rem, seems highly desirable. It recog-
nizes the obsolescence of that historic distinction, and supplies a con-
cept and a term that will facilitate the understanding and reception 
of post-Shajfer8 jurisdictional theory. The concept expressed in the 
new term is essentially the same as that traditionally described as 
"basis for jurisdiction" or "amenability to jurisdiction." Those 
terms, however, are very closely associated with the ideas of jurisdic-
tion of the person or res, and those ideas, in tum, reflect the notioµ, 
once firmly embedded in our national psyche, that "[t]he foundation 
of jurisdiction is physical power."9 If jurisdictional terminology re-
mains rooted in tradition, the process of adjustment to the new era is 
likely to be too protracted. We need a term that does not conjure up 
the notion of physical power, and yet recognizes that jurisdiction em-
anates from sovereignty, which is allocated in today's world on a 
territorial basis. "Territorial jurisdiction of the action" is, I believe, 
such a term. If that term were to become one of current and general 
usage, it would have the added benefit of making it easier for us to 
talk about jurisdictional questions with lawyers of civil-law coun-
tries, who think in terms of "competency over the action" rather than 
jurisdiction over the person. 
Curiously, after phrasing the basic requirement in terms of "terri-
torial jurisdiction of the action," the Restatement (Second) shifts 
back to the traditional terminology in the black-letter propositions 
amplifying "territorial jurisdiction." Thus, in section 4, the rule says 
that "a state court may exercise territorial jurisdiction over persons in 
an action if ... " (emphasis added). Territorial jurisdiction over 
persons presumably means something different from territorial juris-
diction of the action, but if so the difference is not spelled out. In 
section 5 there is a total return to the traditional terminology: "A 
"competence" was used to refer to limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See 
Stabilisierungsfonds for Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). The term competence or competency has different meanings in civil-law countries, 
and usage is somewhat variable. See Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence in Compar-
ative Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 164 (1961). 
8. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
9. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (Holmes, J.). 
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state may exercise jurisdiction over a person who has a relationship 
to the state such that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable." The 
rule then refers to the Restatement (Second) of Co,iflict of Laws to 
define relationships that will be regarded as sufficient. Section 6 
makes the same statement with respect to "Jurisdiction Over 
Things." This shifting from ''territorial jurisdiction of the action" to 
"territorial jurisdiction of the person" to ''jurisdiction of the person" 
leaves one wondering whether the terms are intended to be synony-
mous, or whether there are subtle differences between them. 
The Restatement (Second) does differentiate between ''jurisdic-
tion over things" and "attachment jurisdiction" in section 8. The 
former term relates to actions to determine interests in a thing -
actions that would be called in rem or quasi in rem (type one) under 
the traditional terminology. "Attachment jurisdiction" is used to de-
scribe that special type of quasi in rem action whereby the court ac-
quires jurisdiction to adjudicate a personal claim by attaching 
property subject to its processes. 
Despite the occasionally confusing shifts between new and tradi-
tional terminology, the Comments to the sections dealing with "Ter-
ritorial Jurisdiction" (§§ 4-10) are very helpful in explicating the 
theory and policy concerns reflected in the black-letter principles, 
and the Reporter's Notes provide ample and up~to-date references to 
cases and secondary authorities supporting the positions expressed. 
B. Notice Ojficial in Tenor 
There is one troublesome point in Chapter Two of the Restate-
ment (Second). In addition to jurisdiction of the subject matter and 
"territorial jurisdiction of the action," section 1 requires, as a prereq-
uisite to a valid judgment against a defendant who has not submitted 
to jurisdiction, that he must have been afforded "[a]dequate notice." 
Notice and an opportunity to defend are, of course, aspects of due 
process of law. This constitutional requirement must be met before 
any American judgment - state or federal - can be considered 
valid. 10 State or federal procedural law may, however, impose "no-
tice" requirements that go beyond the constitutional minimum. The 
IO. The Supreme Court has noted: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections .... The means employed must be such as one desrrous of actu-
ally informing the absentee might reasonably aaopt to accomplish it. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (citations omitted), 
In this passage, the Court is clearly addressing the process of notification, not the receipt of 
notice. Actual receipt is not required. 
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black-letter statement of the "adequate notice" requirement in sec-
tion 2 recognizes that both constitutional and procedural require-
ments must be satisfied: 
§ 2 Adequate Notice. 
(1) Except as stated in subsections (2), (3), and (4), notice is ade-
quate only if: 
(a) The notice is official in tenor, and states that the ac-
tion is pending or about to be commenced and that there is 
opportunity to be heard concerning it and affords a reason-
able time in which that opportunity may be exercised; and 
(b) The notice is transmitted in a manner that actually 
notifies the person being addressed or someone who can ade-
quately represent him, or has a reasonable certainty of result-
ing in such notice; and 
(c) The form of the notice and the method employed for 
transmitting it sufficiently comply with the procedure pre-
scribed for giving notice. 
Subsections (a) and (b) appear to address the constitutional aspect of 
the notice requirement. Subsection (c) speaks to the additional re-
quirements, if any, that may be imposed by the relevant procedural 
rules or statutes. 
The puzzling feature of this statement of the adequate notice rule 
is the meaning of the phrase "official in tenor" in subsection (a). The 
qualifying term "in tenor'' seems to suggest that unofficial, unauthor-
ized, or informal notice will satisfy the constitutional requirement if . 
it is "official sounding." If that is the intended meaning, section 2 
apparently declares what the law should be rather than what it is. 
According to Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 11 which still stands as the leading 
case, service of process that will validate a judgment must satisfy two 
requirements: The process and manner of service must be officially 
authorized by some statute (or court rule), and the form and manner 
of serving process prescribed by that statute must be reasonably cal-
culated to get actual notice to the defendant. 
Wuchter indicates that the due process clause is concerned with 
the manner of invoking jurisdiction in two different respects. First, 
and obviously, it is intended to protect the defendant's Hohfeldian 
right to notice and an opportunity to defend. Second, and not so 
obviously, it is concerned about how the government conducts itself 
when it acts to impose unique burdens on persons. Notifying the 
defendant is not the only function fulfilled by the service of process. 
Service of process is the event that marks when the defendant be-
comes subject to the direct authority of the state in a way not shared 
11. 276 U.S. 13 (1928). 
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by other persons. It imposes upon the defendant the burden of doing 
something about the notice he receives, under pain of losing some 
liberty or property if he fails to do so. Apart from the defendant's 
personal constitutional right to notice, the due process clause also 
imposes restrictions on how a state must act when it imposes unique 
burdens on persons. One such restriction, Wuchter seems to say, is 
that the steps that can lead to the imposition of such a burden must 
be formally and officially predetermined and declared rather than 
determined ad hoc. Did the Restatement (Second), by using the term 
"official in tenor," rather than just "official," in its statement of the 
due process requirement, mean to repudiate the idea that due pro-
cess requires that there be some official prescription of the form of 
notice and the manner of serving it? 
The question is hard to answer. It is clear that the Restatement 
(Second) contemplates that there will be a statutory prescription of 
the form and manner of serving process - hence the provision in 
subsection (c). But nothing in section 2 indicates whether a statutory 
prescription is required, unless it is to be found in the phrase "official 
in tenor." 
Examination of the Comments to section 2 does not give a clear 
answer. The only commentary relating to the "official in tenor" term 
is included in Comment c, which deals with the different, but related 
problem of how much deviation from the prescribed procedure can 
be constitutionally tolerated. The question of the constitutionality of 
deviation from prescribed procedure and that of unofficial ad hoc 
procedure run together. The distinction between the two tends to 
become one of degree, like the difference between judicial lawmak-
ing and statutory interpretation. The Restatement (Second) seems to 
treat them as though they were the same. Perhaps they are, but the 
case is not entirely convincing. 
Comment d, entitled "Actual notice," deals with another, but 
closely related, problem that "arises when the person to be notified 
has actually learned of the proceeding despite noncompliance with 
the notice procedure." Comment d deals, accordingly, not with defi-
ciencies in the prescribed procedure, but with the consequences of 
deficient compliance: 
At one time the rule was that actual notice is sufficient so long as 
the form of notice has sufficient dignity to indicate to the notified per-
son that he should take it seriously. The decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Wuchter v. Pizzutti . . . threw doubt on this rule. 
That decision held that in an in personam action, it is not sufficient to 
serve process on a statutorily designated local agent of a non-resident 
defendant; instead, it is necessary to send the non-resident notice by 
March 1982) Res Judicata 671 
mail or other means likely to afford him actual notice. In asserting this 
as a Due Process requirement, however, the Court did not simply say 
that there was a Constitutional obligation to provide such notice, 
which in fact had been given in the case before the Court; it seemed to 
say that there was a Constitutional obligation to have a statute that 
imposed such an obligation. This approach has been subsequently 
construed by some courts to mean that strict mechanical compliance 
with a statutory notice procedure is itself an aspect of the Due Process 
requirement. 
The more discerning cases have recognized that the requirement is 
adequate notice and that it is fulfilled by actual notice whose tenor 
indicates it ought to be taken seriously. They thus return to the rule as 
it was understood before Wuchter v. Pizzutti . . . . [§ 2, Comment d.] 
The difficulty here is that the Comment treats the "actual notice" 
problem it poses as though it were one of due process, a spin-off 
from Wuchter, when in fact the cases rarely, if ever, consider the 
problem in that light. The question whether service of process that 
gives the defendant actual notice is effective to confer jurisdiction, 
despite the plaintifrs failure to comply strictly with statutory require-
ments, nearly always arises in connection with attempts at substi-
tuted or constructive service. The question may be raised by a 
challenge to service before judgment, by a direct attack on the judg-
ment, or by a later collateral attack. The significance of deviation 
and of actual notice can vary depending upon when the issue is 
raised. The courts that have demanded strict compliance, regardless 
of actual notice, both before12 and after13 Wuchter, have nearly al-
ways done so on the basis of state law - often invoking the rule that 
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. 
Perhaps some courts, as indicated in the Comment, misconstrued 
Wuchter as requiring strict compliance as a matter of due process in 
such cases. None of the cases cited in the Reporter's Note as "cases 
after Wuchter treating noncompliance with the notice procedure as 
fatal even when actual notice was imparted" (Reporter's Note to 
Comment d) did so, however. All of those cases based the insistence 
upon strict compliance solely on state law, and none even referred to 
Wuchter. 
If the Comment's statement, "the requirement is adequate notice 
and that is fulfilled by actual notice whose tenor indicates it ought to 
be taken seriously" (Comment d), is limited to cases such as Com-
ment d apparently is considering - ie., where the defects in the 
process of invoking jurisdiction are "more or less bungled attempts 
12. See, e.g., Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 119 N.W. 404 (1909). 
13. See, e.g., Brace v. Busboon, 261 Ark. 556, 549 S.W.2d 802 (1977) (construing Texas 
statute); Tucker v. Diane Elec., Inc., 389 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
672 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:664 
to follow the statutory procedure" (Reporter's Note to Comment d) 
- it is doubtful that any court would be so undiscerning as to disa-
gree with it today. 14 If a state interprets its statute liberally when the 
defendant actually receives all the notice that perfect compliance 
would give him, it is difficult to see any due process problem. The 
state has officially prescribed the procedure, and the defendant's 
right to nptice has been protect~d. 
Problems arise, however, if Comment d is read to mean that "ac-
tual notice whose tenor indicates it ought to be taken seriously" 
could also validate an ad hoc procedure. The black-letter statement 
of the constitutional requirements in section 2(a) and (b) indicates 
that notice "official in tenor'' will be adequate even if the defendant 
does not get notice, as long as the method chosen to transmit it "has 
a reasonable certainty of resulting in [actual] notice." If section 2 
means that an ad hoc process for invoking jurisdiction that sounds 
official and is served in an official-appearing way, but for which no 
statutory authorization exists, will satisfy due process even if the de-
fendant does not get actual notice, the proposition seems highly 
questionable. Due process could conceivably be violated even where 
the question is deviation from a prescribed statutory procedure if the 
defendant does not get notice; there may be a due process limit on 
the liberality with which a court may interpret "substantial compli-
ance" with its statute when there is a failure of notice. And ad hoc 
process may raise due process problems even when it does produce 
actual notice. A state may authorize some judicial innovation by 
provisions such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, and may con-
ceivably authorize private parties to exercise some judgment about 
the form and manner of serving process. Many states do, as the Re-
statement (Second) points out, permit private parties to type up and 
deliver the process. But where there is no such authorization, and 
where the defendant does not get actual notice, due process seems 
doubly questionable. 
The principal support for the proposition that official-sounding 
ad hoc process may satisfy due process, even if no actual notice is 
given (if that is the proposition), is a statement in Comment d imme-
diately following the part quoted above: 
Indeed such an approach is necessary to accommodate the require-
ment that the person responsible for effectuating notice has to depart 
14. Among recent cases upholding the validity of service under such circumstances, even 
when the issue is raised before judgment, is Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 
F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977). Contra Headrick v. Fordham, 154 Ga. App. 415, 268 S.E.2d 753 
(1980). 
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from normal procedure when he knows the person addressed will not 
be reached by that procedure. See Commentf. By definition, such a 
departure results in following a procedure that was not prescribed by 
statute or rule. 
Some element of formality in the notice is necessary, however. A 
person should not be bound to respond to a rumor that he is being 
sued. The requirement of formality, i.e., that the notice be sufficiently 
well drawn to seem official, permits an objective distinction to be made 
between casual information about a suit and notice that is substantially 
adequate even if technically imperfect. It is not necessary, however, 
that the notice be issued by an official; applicable law may permit a 
party or his attorney to issue the notice. [§ 2, Comment d.] 
This passage seems to say that validation of ad hoc process is neces-
sary "to accommodate the requirement that the person responsible 
for effectuating notice has to depart'from normal procedure when he. 
knows the person addressed will not be reached by that procedure" 
(§ 2, Comment d). This "requirement" is incorporated in subsection 
(2) of the black-letter statement of section 2: 
(2) If the party responsible for effectuating notice knows that the per-
son to be notified is so situated or is in such condition that ordinarily 
employed means of notice will be ineffectual, other means must be 
used that actually notify, or have a reasonable certainty of resulting in 
actual notice to, the person or someone who can adequately represent 
him. [§ 2(2).] 
In this subsection, too, the Restatement (Second) seems to be project-
ing what the law should be, if the intended meaning is that private 
litigants are sometimes constitutionally required to resort to proce-
dures "not prescribed by statute or rule" (Comment d). 
There is, of course, a famous statement in Mullane that "[t]he 
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing 
the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."15 It is clear, 
however, that the Court there was referring to choosing from among 
alternative prescribed methods, not making up new ones. There are 
two Supreme Court cases holding that the state, as a civil litigant in 
proceedings to divest the defendant of specific property, had sub-
jected the defendant to a denial of due process by choosing a method 
of serving process that it knew would be unlikely to afford the de-
fendant adequate notice. 16 In both cases, an officially prescribed al-
ternative procedure could have been employed. The Court did not 
suggest that a new procedure should be devised ad hoc. Some state 
courts have invalidated service of process that conformed to statu-
15. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
16. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 
U.S. 141 (1956). 
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tory prescriptions where the plaintiff knew it would probably be in-
effectual, and where another prescribed procedure was available that 
was more likely to reach the defendant. 17 Because there is usually an 
acceptable alternative prescribed procedure, very few, if any, cases 
can be cited for the proposition that the plaintiff has a due process 
duty to make up a procedure, especially when the plaintiff is a pri-
vate litigant.18 
Perhaps there should be such a requirement. But such a require-
ment has not yet appeared in the cases. And if there is no such re-
quirement, the principal support for the proposition that official-
sounding ad hoc process satisfies due process, even if it does not lead 
to actual notice, falls. 
Of course, the big question here is whether the official prescrip-
tion requirement of Wuchter really does stand independently of the 
requirement of notice reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. 
It seems to me that there is more evidence that it does than that it 
does not. Recent cases that have actually faced the Wuchter situa-
tion, i.e., where actual notice was supplied even though the statute 
did not require steps likely to produce such notice, have refused to 
uphold jurisdiction on due process grounds. 19 There is no reason 
why the notice procedure has to be prescribed in the statute unless 
there has to be a statute.20 
17. See, e.g., Republique Franfrllise v. Cellosilk Mfg. Co., 309 N.Y. 269, 128 N.E.2d 750 
(1955). A couple of Oregon cases seem to say there is a constitutional duty to choose the 
alternative most likely to reach defendant, even though both are reasonably likely to produce 
actual notice. See Thoenes v. Tatro, 270 Or. 775, 529 P.2d 913 (1974) (after holdmg that 
service was not made at defendant's abode within the meaning of the substituted service stat-
ute, court went on to indicate that even if the address where the defendant was served had 
been his abode, service would have been invalid since the plaintiff knew that the defendant 
was out of state at school, and could have served him there under the long-arm statute); Dick-
enson v. Babich, 213 Or. 472, 326 P.2d 446 (1958) (implying that service by publication and 
mailing insufficient when personal service outside the state could have been effected). 
18. After looking fairly hard, the only case I could find that comes even close to supporting 
the proposition is Murphy v. Helena Rubenstein Co., 234 F. Supp. 893 (D.N.J. 1964). It does 
suggest that jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that had once qualified to do business but 
later withdrew, leaving no address where process could be served in the state, might be upheld 
on the basis of ad hoc service that actually notified it. It also suggests that the plaintiff could 
not rest on service that it knew would not reach the defendant when the plaintiff knew how to 
reach defendant out of state. Whether the plaintiff's obligation in that respect rested on the 
Constitution or state law is not clear. In any event, there apparently was an alternative pre-
scribed procedure. 
19. E.g. ABC Drilling Co. v. Hughes Group, 609 P.2d 763 (Okla. 1980). Accord Koster v. 
Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981) (the court there refused to enforce a Dutch 
judgment on minimum contact grounds, but expressed the view, in response to a Wuchter 
argument, that the Dutch procedure for invoking jurisdiction would not support a judgment 
where it did not require the Dutch official served to notify defendant, although such notifica-
tion was routinely made). 
20. A recent case has held that service by mail, actually received, does not confer jurisdic-
tion where the statute does not authorize such service. See Rosemary K. v. Kevin D.C., 422 
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Since the Wright, Miller, and Cooper volume does not deal with 
personal jurisdiction, we do not know its position on this issue. 
II. REs JUDICATA 
If we next turn to the main subject of both works, the preclusive 
effects of judgments, the first thing to note is the terminology. The 
term "res judicata" is used by some to refer only to the claim preclu-
sive effects ofjudgments.21 To those who employ the term that way, 
res judicata means one thing; collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 
another. Others use the term "res judicata" to refer to all "things" 
that may be "adjudicated" in an action, i.e., to both claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion. The Restatement (Second) uses the term in the 
latter, broader sense (as did the first Restatement). The Wright, 
Miller, ap.d Cooper treatise, too, favors the broader usage (p. 8). 
Since the broader usage seems the more logical, it may be hoped that 
the combined effects of these two new works will be to hasten the 
day when it will displace the other usage entirely.22 
The Restatement (Second) and the treatise do differ slightly in 
their treatment of some preferred usages. To describe that branch of 
res judicata that refers to the preclusive effect of a prior judgment on 
a claim presented in a later suit, the treatise apparently favors the 
term "claim preclusion." It then qualifies its recommendation by 
noting that it may sometimes be· convenient to supplement "claim 
preclusion" with the traditional terms: merger, referring to the effect 
of a prior judgment for the claimant, and bar, referring to the effect 
of a prior judgment against the claimant (pp. 8-9). The Restatement 
(Second), on the other hand, prefers the traditional terms "merger" 
and "bar." The Restatement (Second) does acknowledge, however, 
that "the law of merger and bar'' is "sometimes referred to as the law 
of 'claim preclusion' " (Introductory Note to § 24), and the Reporter 
himself has expressed the view that "merger'' and "bar" should have 
been dropped.23 Both the treatise and the Restatement (Second) 
adopt the term "issue preclusion," instead of the older "direct estop-
pel" and "collateral estoppel." The treatise's position seems the 
more logical: It implicitly expresses the hope that the new usage will 
A.2d 1272 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1980). There was no indication that the ruling was constitutionally 
based, however. 
21. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.405[1], at 622 (2d ed. 1980). 
22. Interestingly, however, a leading casebook on civil procedure, co-authored by one of 
the treatise's writers, prefers a narrower usage. It only notes the existence of the other view. 
See J. CoUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1029-30 (3d ed. 1980). 
23. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related 
Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564, 586 (1981). 
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some day become settled by general acceptance of "claim preclu-
sion" and "issue preclusion" (p. 6). 
A. Claim Preclusion 
Since the principle of claim preclusion (merger and bar) pre-
cludes a later suit on the same "claim" ( or cause of action) not only 
concerning matters that were advanced in the first suit, but also with 
respect to all other matters that were within the scope of that claim, 
the most important issue in the law of claim preclusion is that of 
determining the scope of the claim. On this point, the two works 
under examination adopt the same approach, the one embodied in 
section 24 of the Restatement (Second). Instead of giving a concep-
tual, analytic definition of the dimensions of a "claim," the rule uses 
terms very similar to those used in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to describe what counterclaims are compulsory24 and what 
cross-claims are permissible.25 The rule thus defines the claim in 
pragmatic terms relating to the temporal, spatial, or motivational 
connections between the facts involved in the claims asserted in both 
actions, as well as to common expectations and trial convenience 
(§ 24(2)). The deliberate looseness of the rule leaves so much room 
for evaluation on a case-by-case basis, it could easily become very 
uncertain in application. However, the comments to section 24 of 
the Restatement (Second), and the commentary offered by the trea-
tise (§ 4407) to explain the function of the test, and to weigh the 
conflicting policy interests that are implicated in its application, are 
lucid and thorough. Copious references to decided cases are in-
cluded in the Restatement Reporter's Notes, and are augmented by 
the annotations in the treatise. There should thus be no more uncer-
tainty in the application of the rule than in the "same right" or 
"same wrong" or "same evidence" tests that some courts have pur-
ported to follow, and the result should be a much more rational bal-
ancing of the interests at stake. 
Both works also present very clearly the troublesome problem of 
the use of claim preclusion against one who was a defendant in the 
former suit. The approach of the Restatement (Second) to this prob-
lem does not differ fundamentally from that of the first Restatement, 
but the Comments and Reporter's Notes bring the problem into 
clearer focus, and accommodate the procedural changes wrought by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - most notably the compul-
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g), 14(a), IS(c), 20(a). 
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sory counterclaim rule, which the first Restatement barely noticed. 
The Restatement (Second) rejects the first Restatement's notion that 
preclusion of claims that were defenses in the first suit should de-
pend upon whether the defense was "legal" or "equitable" (Com-
ment a). 
Both works cogently set forth the exceptions to the rules of-claim 
preclusion, and eschew the proposition sometimes seen in the cases 
that "res judicata will not be applied where it would work an injus-
tice." Their position should draw support from the recent decision 
of the Supreme Court in Federated .Department Stores, Inc. v. Moi-
tie. 26 Without some indication of what the determinants of 'justice" 
are in this context, the "injustice" exception is meaningless. The ap-
proach taken in the Restatement (Second) is more precise. Section 26 
identifies a number of situations where claim preclusion will not ap-
ply. The situations described in subsections (d), (e) and (f) of section 
26(1) are stated very generally, but the purpose of providing an ex-
ception for such situations shows through the black-letter text, and 
the Comments and illustrations dispel most of what uncertainty may 
remain. The treatise covers basically the same ground, but organizes 
the cases somewhat differently, and cites some more and differ~nt 
cases (§ 4415). 
Anything else that I might say about the treatment of claim pre-
clusion in both of these works would simply be to applaud the thor-
oughness, clarity, and perception it reflects, and the remarkable 
scholarship underlying it in both instances. 
B. Issue Preclusion 
Turning to the "issue preclusion" aspect of res judicata, we can 
see that the Restatement (Second) departs from the terminology of 
the first Restatement (as noted previously). In stating the general 
rule of issue preclusion, the Restatement (Second) makes it clear that 
the same rule applies, whether the second suit is based on the same 
claim or a different claim: 
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by 
a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action be-
tween the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. [§ 27.] 
The first Restatement would have referred to the former as "direct 
estoppel" and the latter as "collateral estoppel," although its issue 
preclusion mi.es were generally expressed in terms of collateral es-
26. 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981). 
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toppel. In other respects, the general rule of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) is essentially the same as that of the first, except that it applies 
to issues of both fact and law, whereas the earlier Restatement's gen-
eral rule applied just to facts. 
I. The General Rule 
Like the first Restatement (§ 68), the Restatement (Second)'s sec-
tion 27 limits the application of the rule to issues "actually litigated 
and determined" (§ 27). Although the treatise, too, regards actual 
litigation and determination as essential, the matter is not free from 
uncertainty. Apparently there was some disagreement among the 
members of the advisory committee:27 The colloquy between two of 
the nation's leading res judicata scholars, Professor Allan D. Vestal 
and the Restatement (Second) Reporter, Professor Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr., on this issue is fascinating and illuminating.28 The biggest 
problem with the actual litigation requirement lies in determining 
when an issue has been actually litigated. The Restatement (Second) 
gives a definition in Comment d, and provides some illustrations. 
The meaning is amplified considerably in the treatise (§ 4419), and 
persons facing questions about the meaning of "actually litigated" 
and "actually decided" (§ 4420) would do well to consult it. 
The general rule also states that the determination of the issue 
must have been "essential to the judgment" (§ 27) rendered in the 
first action. This requirement raises a question about issue preclu-
sion where more than one issue was actually litigated and decided in 
the first suit, either of which would independently support the judg-
ment rendered. In such a case, can it be said that either determina-
tion was "essential to the judgment"? The first Restatement (§ 68, 
Comment n) took the position that both determinations were preclu-
sive. Moore's Federal Practice, too, endorsed that position.29 The 
Restatement (Second), on the other hand, while acknowledging that 
the question is close, takes the position that neither determination 
should have preclusive effect because neither is essential (Comment 
i). If the losing party should appeal, however, and the appellate 
court considers and upholds both determinations, the judgment may 
be conclusive as to both, according to Comment o. 
The treatise's more innovative analysis of the problem examines 
27. See Vestal, Tlte Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest i)issent, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 464, 470-71 (1981). 
28. See id at 470-97 (including an alternative general rule at 496); Hazard, supra note 23, at 
574-86 (1981). 
29. See lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.443(5], at 3922-23 (2d ed. 1980). 
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some alternatives to the views that both determinations are preclu-
sive or that neither is. The treatise apparently favors a compromise 
solution: Where there are alternative independent :findings, issue 
preclusion should attach only to those :findings, if any, that the sec-
ond court can determine (without extended inquiry) "reflect . . . a 
careful process of decision" (§ 4421, p. 208). That rule would ac-
commodate the appeal exception from the Restatement (Second)'s 
rule and also better serve the policy of avoiding repetitive litigation. 
On the other hand, it would make the issue tum on the meaning of 
"extended inquiry" and "careful process of decision." The authors 
of the treatise acknowledge that their position "has not won any 
champions" (§ 4421, p. 204). 
2. Exceptions to the General Rule 
The next section of the Restatement (Second), section 28, covers 
exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. It brings together 
some exceptions that the first Restatement did not recognize, and also 
reformulates those that it did. Although the phrasing of most of the 
exceptions is rather broad, here as in other places in the Restatement 
(Second) where broad black-letter rules are given, the terms selected 
reflect the underlying policies, and the Comments and Reporter's 
Notes admirably elucidate the considerations that should control the 
analysis. The "full, fair opportunity to litigate" qualification on the 
application of issue preclusion is included as an exception in section 
28(5)(c). Other relevant considerations, such as change in legal cli-
mate, the quality of procedure available in the first and second ac-
tions, the allocation of burden of proof, foreseeability, appealability, 
and the potential impact of nonparties are dealt with in specific 
subsections. 
The treatise deals at length with most of the matters covered by 
the Restatement's exceptions. It discusses, with thorough documen-
tation, the significance of different standards of evidence (§ 4422), 
the quality of the first decision and the opportunity to litigate 
(§ 4423), the problem of foreseeability (§ 4424), questions of law and 
law application (§ 4425), and general 'justice" factors (§ 4426). The 
discussion of foreseeability includes a lengthy and penetrating analy-
sis of the "ultimate fact" /"mediate datum" distinction, and of the 
famous decision in The Evergreens v. Nunan,30 which rests on that 
distinction and the role that the fact for which preclusion is sought 
would play in the later suit. Neither the treatise nor the Restatement 
30. 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). 
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(Second) regards the Evergreens test as satisfactory since the test 
tends to obscure the real problem, which is the foreseeability of the 
later use of the matter adjudicated. 
Further complications arise if the second suit includes parties 
who did not appear in the first suit. Section 29 of the Restatement 
(Second) sets out a comprehensive rule to regulate issue preclusion 
in subsequent litigation between a party to the first suit and a non-
party. The first Restatement had endorsed the traditional "mutual-
ity" rule. The Restatement (Second) rejects mutuality as a general 
requirement, and declares that "a party precluded from re-litigating 
an issue with an opposing party . . . is also precluded from doing so 
with another person"(§ 29). However, the rejection of the mutuality 
requirement is carefully hedged. The black-letter rule specifically 
incorporates the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" proviso, as 
well as the other exceptions to issue preclusion generally from sec-
tion 28. In addition, section 29 lists eight other factors, including a 
catchall "other compelling circumstances" factor, that should be 
considered before determining whether the former party should be 
held precluded, or, instead, permitted to relitigate the issue against 
the nonparty. The result is a good blueprint for courts in states that 
reject the mutuality principle to follow in making that determina-
tion. Because the rule identifies and specifies so many considera-
tions, including the final "other compelling circumstances" factor, 
courts that have heretofore been reluctant to abandon the mutuality 
rule - perhaps because of a fear of the possibilities for injustice that 
might open up - may now be encouraged to fall into line with the 
majority of states (and federal courts) that have abandoned mutual-
ity as a hard and fast requirement. 
The treatise, focusing as it does on federal courts, contains a copi-
ously footnoted section clearly analyzing the mutuality problem, its 
rejection as a rule for federal courts, and the limitations on non-
mutual preclusion that the federal cases have recognized and should 
recognize (§§ 4463-4465). · 
Sections 30 and 32 of the Restatement (Second) take a firm posi-
tion on another problem that has been quite controversial -
whether issue preclusion should be attributed to issues actually liti-
gated (§ 27) where the defendant has made only a "limited appear-
ance" in an action in which the court's jurisdiction was predicated 
upon jurisdiction over a res rather than over the person. Section 
30(3), dealing with judgments in suits that would be traditionally 
characterized as in rem or quasi in rem (type one), and 32(3), dealing 
with "attachment jurisdiction," or quasi in rem (type two), state that 
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the normal rules of issue preclusion apply to matters adjudicated in 
such suits, even though the defendant is accorded the right of limited 
appearance. In talcing this position, the Restatement (Second) re-
solves an ambiguity in the first Restatement, which had apparently 
taken conflicting positions on the question.31 
Although it recognizes that the question is close, the Restatement 
(Second) concludes that the balance of the conflicting policy consid-
erations favors application of issue preclusion to matters actually, 
fully, and fairly litigated in such a proceeding, subject, of course, to 
the regular exceptions embodied in sections 28 and 29. 
The treatise authors apparently reach the opposite conclusion. I 
think that they are saying that no issue preclusion should result from 
a limited appearance, any more than claim preclusion should. (The 
Restatement (Second) would agree with them on claim preclusion.) 
After giving the Restatement (Second)'s position on issue preclusion, 
the treatise declares: 
This conclusion so effectively undermines the benefits of a limited ap-
pearance, however, that others may reach the opposite conclusion. To 
the extent that some courts do choose to deny preclusion, this is an area 
in which other courts should refuse to apply more expansive rules of 
preclusion. To apply issue preclusion after a limited appearance in a 
court that would deny preclusion would defeat the power of the first 
court to establish an effective opportunity for a limited appearance. 
[§ 4431, p. 298.] 
The treatise apparently argues, in other words, that the Restatement 
(Second) 's rule would wholly vitiate the intended effect of rules per-
mitting limited appearances. 
It seems to me that the Restatement (Second) has the better side 
in this dispute. Before the decisions in Shaffer v. Heitner32 and Rush 
v. Savchuk,33 the question was much closer than it is now. Now no 
court can exercise jurisdiction, whether in personam, in rem, or quasi 
in rem, except under circumstances that would satisfy the due pro-
cess limitations of International Shoe, Hanson v. Denckla, and their 
progeny. If the object of an action that is predicated on jurisdiction 
over property is to determine interests in that property, the place 
where the property is situated is universally recognized as an appro-
priate forum. If issues are actually litigated (§ 23) in the course of 
the proceeding, it is hard to think of any ~eason to permit relitigation 
of those issues other than those factors identified as limitations on 
31. Compare REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS§ 40, Comment a (1942), with id. at§ 76(2) .. 
32. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
33. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
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issue preclusion generally in section 28 of the Restatement (Second). 
If the object of the action is to enforce a personal claim - the "at-
tachment jurisdiction" situation of section 32 - the court ordinarily 
will not be permitted to entertain the suit at all unless the connection 
between the defendant and that forum is such that in personam juris-
diction could have been exercised if a procedure had been available 
for that purpose. If it would be fundamentally fair to apply issue 
preclusion to an in personam judgment against that defendant in 
that action in that court, it is hard to see why the technical difference 
in the procedure for invoking jurisdiction should lead to a different 
result when the action is based on attachment jurisdiction. If the 
forum is too inconvenient, or the stake too low, or if any of the other 
reasons noted in section 28 for denying issue preclusion are present, 
relitigation should be permitted, whether the action is brought on 
personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over property. But if the defen-
dant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues there, and 
did, under circumstances that would warrant preclusion if the action 
were in personam, why should preclusion not also be warranted 
when the action proceeds by attachment jurisdiction rather than 
through a long-arm statute? If the Restatement (Second) 's provisions 
for limiting the effects of issue preclusion generally are followed, 
there is simply no need for a limited appearance doctrine in connec-
tion with "attachment jurisdiction" after Shaffer v. Heitner. To be 
sure, there may be some cases where the balance of contacts and 
conveniences that International Shoe calls for would permit the exer-
cise of jurisdiction limited to the property, but would not permit gen-
eral in personamjurisdiction.34 If there are such cases, however, the 
exceptions to issue preclusion embodied in section 27 should be suffi-
cient to accommodate them. 
3. Interstate Issue Preclusion 
The treatise provision quoted above does not clearly declare that 
issue preclusion should not apply to matters litigated on a limited 
appearance, but it does say that if the court in which the matter was 
adjudicated allows a limited appearance and denies issue-preclusive 
effect to matters adjudicated therein, courts in other states should not 
apply more expansive rules of preclusion to it. If the second court 
were to apply the more expansive rule, it ''would defeat the power of 
34. Professor Silberman suggests as such a case one in which the plaintiff is a forum resi-
dent and the defendant's property is there, but where there are no other relevant contacts with 
the forum state. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End oJan Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 72 
(1978). 
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the first court to establish an effective opportunity for a limited ap-
pearance" (§ 4431, p. 298). Since the Restatement (Second) focuses 
on the "intramural" law of res judicata, it does not deal with this 
problem. 
Posing the question as the treatise does - Should a court in the 
second state be able to defeat the first court's power to establish an 
effective opportunity for a limited appearance? - diverts attention 
from what appears to me to be a more fundamental question: 
Should the first state, by adopting a narrow issue-preclusion rule, be 
able to force the second state to devote its judicial resources to the 
relitigation of issues once fully and fairly litigated elsewhere, con-
trary to the second state's own policy? I have elsewhere expressed 
the opinion that a second state that follows the Restatement (Sec-
ond) 's general limitations on issue preclusion is not prevented by the 
full faith and credit clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, or the due process 
clause from ascribing more expansive preclusive effect to the judg-
ment than it would have in the rendering state.35 The first state's 
"power to establish an effective opportunity for a limited appear-
ance" should be limited so that it may waste only its own judicial 
resources in relitigating issues already fully and fairly litigated unless 
other states, acting in pursuit of their own sovereign will, choose to 
indulge in that same extravagance. 
The treatise, in a different section, basically agrees that there 
should be limits on the extent to which one state's narrow preclusion 
rules should be allowed to force another state to open its courts to 
relitigate a fairly litigated issue. The authors offer a compromise.36 
If the defendant invokes issue preclusion against a plaintiff in the 
second suit, the court in the second state should be able to dismiss 
the claim, despite the fact that the issues could be relitigated under 
the law of the state where the first judgment was rendered. The dis-
missal should be without prejudice, however, so as to leave the plain-
tiff free to relitigate in the original court or in some other forum that 
would permit it. If the plaintiff sought to preclude the defendant, 
however, dismissal without prejudice would not offer an appropriate 
35. Casad, supra note 6, at 528-32. 
36. The treatise presents its compromise position, not in discussing limited-appearance 
preclusion, but in connection with the assertion of preclusion by nonmutual parties in a second 
action, when the first court would not permit it. The competing policy considerations are, 
however, essentially the same in the two types of problems. 
The Restatement (Second) raises the problem of the second court's applying more preclu-
sive effect than the first would when it discusses the preclusive effects of state court judgments 
in later federal actions. See § 86, Comment e. The Comment recognizes the competing views, 
but does not seem to prefer one over the other. 
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solution. In such a case, the treatise argues that the second state 
should permit relitigation if the first state would (§ 4467, p. 648). 
Ill. COLLATERAL ATTACK ON GROUNDS OF SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
Another point on which the Restatement (Second) differs from its 
predecessor is in its statement of the rule relating to collateral attacks 
upon judgments for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The first Re-
statement dealt with this question in the often-quoted section 10, 
which stated that if the court in the first suit determined that it had 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, no collateral attack would be per-
mitted "unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is 
outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond 
its jurisdiction." Section IO then gave a nonexclusive list of factors 
to be considered in striking the policy balance. 
The Restatement (Second) states the rule more specifically and 
positively in section 12.37 The rule applies only to contested actions. 
Although it does not require that the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion itself be actually contested and litigated (Comment d), it does 
require that the prior proceedings involve more than simply a judg-
ment by default. These qualifications on the applicability of the 
rule, which are basically like those of the first Restatement,38 raise 
two questions. 
The first is, How can the issue of subject matter jurisdiction be 
foreclosed when it was not "actually litigated" in light of the general 
rule of issue preclusion (§ 27), which treats actual litigation as essen-
tial? The ~wer is that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is not 
like other issues. The traditional dogma about subject matter juris-
diction recognized a difference between that issue and issues con-
cerning personal jurisdiction or the merits in the proposition that 
37. When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes 
the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent 
litigation except if: 
(I) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its 
entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or 
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another 
tribunal or agency of government; or 
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately 
informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of 
procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity be-
latedly to attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
§ 12. This rule applies to collateral attacks and generally also to proceedings seeking relief 
from a contested judgment. § 69. Different provisions are made for direct proceedings to 
obtain relief from a default judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. §§ 65-66. 
38. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10, Comment c (1942). 
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subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties by con-
sent, waiver, or estoppel. The Restatement (Second) recognizes a dif-
ference, too, but takes a more realistic and modem view of the 
problem. Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that ought to be liti-
gated in the same suit that produces a judgment on the merits: 
Even if the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has not been raised and 
determined, the judgment after becoming final should ordinarily be 
treated as wholly valid if the controversy has been litigated in any 
other respect. The principle to be applied in this situation is essentially 
that of claim preclusion, particularly the proposition that a judgment 
should be treated as resolving not only all issues actually litigated but 
all issues that might have been litigated. [Comment d.] 
This poses a dilemma, however, for claim preclusion applies only to 
"valid" judgments, and to hand down a valid judgment the court 
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Comment d to sec-
tion 12 of the Restatement (Second) wrestles with this dilemma and 
concludes that the interests at stake in the subject matter jurisdiction 
issue are primarily those of society, not the parties. Society's interest 
in ensuring that one of its courts does not exceed the limits of its 
subject matter jurisdiction is significantly different if the issue is 
raised early in the proceeding than if the issue is raised after a con-
tested judgment. On balance, the Restatement (Second) concludes 
that the rule of preclusion after final judgment in a contested action 
where the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was not actually liti-
gated should be essentially the same as if the issue had been liti-
gated. The issue should not be considered in subsequent litigation 
unless one of the exceptions to section 12 applies. 
The second question is, If rule 12 does not apply to default judg-
ments, what is the rule relating to collateral attack against default 
judgments on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction? The answer 
given in the Restatement (Second) is far from clear. Comment f to 
section 12 notes that the same claim preclusion analysis offered to 
. explain foreclosure of the issue after a contested action in which the 
issue was not raised could apply as well to a default judgment. The 
Comment recognizes, however, that the policy arguments for conclu-
siveness of the judgment in the case of default are weaker. The con-
clusion, if I understand it correctly, is that the state in which the 
judgment was rendered may permit the issue of subject matter juris-
diction to be raised in a collateral attack on the default judgment, or 
it may require that any challenges to the judgment on that ground be 
made directly, by a motion to vacate or some similar procedure. 
While Professor Karen Moore sees the Restatement (Second) as gen-
erally supporting the view that would permit collateral attack on de-
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fault judgments for want of subject matter jurisdiction, with 
exceptions,39 the Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise sees the Re-
statement (Second) as generally opposing it (§ 4428, p. 277 n.13). On 
the question of which is the preferable view, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) seems mildly to favor the "direct challenge" rule, but without 
much conviction. 
IV. RES JUDICATA IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
The Restatement (Second) and the treatise, finally, make one 
other major contribution to our understanding of res judicata: They 
analyze the operation of res judicata principles in the interplay be-
tween state and federal courts. The importance of this matter was 
brought sharply to our attention by the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Allen v. McCurry,4-0 but the subject goes much further than 
the problem of civil rights litigation presented there. The Restate-
ment (Second) addresses the question of the effect of a state court 
judgment in a subsequent federal action in section 86, and the ques-
tion of the source of law that determines the res judicata effects of 
federal judgments in section 87. The first question is basically an-
swered by the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The 
answer to the second question is that federal law controls the res 
judicata effects of federal judgments, although for some purposes 
federal law may incorporate state doctrine, particularly in diversity 
cases. 
The Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise provides an extremely 
thorough, thoughtful, and helpful treatment of the problems of res 
judicata in a federal system (§§ 4466-4473). The textual analysis 
penetrates the fog that tends to obscure this subject. The task of clar-
ifying an area that is a confusing mix of full faith and credit, Erie, 
federal supremacy, article III considerations, res judicata, and basic 
procedure is a formidable one. The treatise does the job admirably, 
and, characteristically, provides ample citations to cases and periodi-
cal literature41 to assist those who wish to pursue further any particu-
lar topic. 
39. Moore, Co/lateral A/lack on Subject Maller Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 552 (1981). 
40. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
41. The authors acknowledge particularly insights drawn from an article by one member 
of the Advisory Committee to the Restatement (Second), see p. 618 (citing Professor Ronan 
Degnan's Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976)). This article is cited frequently. 
Articles of Professor Allan Vestal, another member of the Committee, are also cited with some 
frequency. See, e.g., Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal 
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723 (1968). 
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CONCLUSION 
Much more could be said about these two important books. In 
combination, they give us the tools to update, rationalize, and unify 
the law of judgments, if courts are given the opportunity, and are 
willing, to consider what they say. Despite disagreements I might 
have with it on minor points of jurisdiction, I feel that the Restate-
ment (Second) merits general acceptance as the American law of res 
judicata. The Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise can augment it as 
a general exegesis of the principles of that law. I hope that the au-
thors of the treatise, and the West Publishing Company, will be will-
ing to permit the book that is now volume 18 of a multivolume 
treatise to be sold separately, with its own index and table of cases, 
so that it can be made available to those who want a good one-vol-
ume book on res judicata, but who perhaps cannot afford that whole 
magnificent work. 
